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For many readers, the title of this Special Focus may seem
doubly puzzling: what is corporatization and why is there no mention
of privatization? In the Chinese context corporatization, literally,
"stockification" (gufenhua), refers specifically to the transformation
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into joint-stock companies, in
which the state, or its agents, continue to hold the controlling interest.
Thus, if we take privatization to mean the "transfer of ownership or
control of assets from the public to the private sector,"' then
although actual and constructive privatization is occurring in sectors
of the Chinese economy, and may eventually occur in large-scale
SOEs, what has been happening to these enterprises over the last
several years is not truly privatization.
Moreover, the notion of privatization remains ideologically
sensitive. Indeed, in a recent interview, a senior Chinese economic
official denied that privatization is "the orientation for China's
enterprise restructuring" and insisted that "the joint-stock system is
just a property organization form [that] does not mean private
ownership" because the original state capital is not transferred.2
Smaller SOEs, acknowledged the official, may transfer original stateowned capital, but the state uses the proceeds to reinvest in the stateowned sector in order to insure that the state and collectively owned
public sector retains its dominant position and leading role. Thus, the
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policy-makers continue to treat this transformation of the state sector
as a process of corporatization, not privatization.
In our fascination with China's corporatization experiment, we
tend to forget that it is the fifth in a line dating back to the beginning
of this century. In 1904, during the last decade of the Qing dynasty,
then in 1914, 1929, and 1946 under the Republican government,
company laws were enacted. Yet as a recent study of these laws by
Bill Kirby cogently argues, none of these Western-style corporate law
frameworks proved to be the "essential vehicle for private Chinese
economic development" that their creators had envisioned.' Of
interest not only to historians, but also to the current experimenters,
is why not? The positive explanation, suggests Kirby, is that the
Chinese model of family-based companies worked so well at forming
capital and competing commercially, there was little incentive to
adopt impersonal corporate forms. Moreover, the few times family
firms adopted these forms, they, much like the state in both the
Republic and the People's Republic, sedulously protected their
position by never separating investment and management.4 Kirby
also offers a negative explanation for the diminished impact of
western corporate legal frameworks that focuses on the question of
trust: firms had to trust the government to be a friend not foe, to
enforce its own laws, and to maintain a society that was stable beyond
the family. For its part the government had to trust that firms would
obey the law and pay taxes. On neither side, concludes Kirby, was
there such trust.5
To a large extent, the sharply disparate assessments of the
current corporate experiment found in the two articles that follow also
revolve around issues of trust, particularly between the markets and
the state. In the first of the two pieces, Fang Liufang, though among
the academic specialists consulted by the drafters of the Company
Law, writes from the traditional Chinese intellectual's perspective of
detached, critical outsider. His Article derives from an extensive
study, first prepared for the Asian Development Bank, of the
implementation of China's experiment in corporatization. From effect
he infers intent. And like many foreign scholars of contemporary
Chinese law,6 Fang finds a state determined to use the law in
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instrumentalist fashion. Still driven by the mentality of "the plan,"
the state has halted experimentation, imposed standardization
regardless of costs, and not so coincidentally served its own interests.
Gao Xiqing's response is that of the outsider as insider. As an
outsider, Gao helped promote the idea of securities markets and cofounded the first securities law firm in China. Now on the inside as
chief counsel and director of public offerings at the China Securities
Regulatory Commission, an organization of which Fang is sharply
critical, Gao defends the instrumental actions of the state, denying
that it has been a "quixotic, irrational" designer and arguing that
planning and control are both inevitable and necessary in the
transition to a market economy. To Gao standardization and
regulation are not as nefarious as Fang suggests. They aim to create
a stable, predictable corporate system, not an "unworkable ...
paternalistic and self-perpetuating" one. Yet, as Gao implicitly
acknowledges, things have not always turned out as intended.
Pointed but productive, this intellectual exchange between one of
the Chinese corporatization experiment's most thorough scholars and
one of its leading participants provides a unique window onto this
fundamental reform.
The editors of the Duke Journalof ComparativeandInternational
Law offer these articles with the hope that they will help further the
understanding of China's corporatization framework. To this end,
every effort has been made to provide the reader with both interesting articles and useful research. To facilitate further research, we
have provided translations of key Chinese terms and, when possible,
citations to sources that may be found at most major research
libraries. Particular attention has been paid to the citations in Fang
Liufang's Article, where we have included as much information as
possible to aid those who use the Article as a research tool, even if
the inclusion of such information is contrary to the letter of the
Bluebook.7

7. The long editorial process for this Special Focus has demonstrated that the Bluebook
is not as comprehensive as it would have its readers believe. It is perhaps time that we, the
student editors of U.S. law journals and law reviews, reconsider how we should cite to foreign
legal materials.

